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Abstract
Based on a rich personnel data set of a large university we ￿nd strong evidence
for the existence of an internal labor market. First, the lowest academic rank is a
strong port of entry and the highest rank is a port of exit. Second, wages do not follow
external wage developments, since they follow administrative rules that have not been
modi￿ed for a long time. We subsequently look at internal promotion dynamics to
assess the relevance of alternative internal labor market theories. A unique feature of
our data is that we have good measures of performance. Consistent with incentive
theories of internal labor markets, research and teaching performance turn out to be
crucial determinants of promotion dynamics. Learning theories of internal labor mar-
kets appear to have support when we do not account for observed performance, but the
evidence becomes much weaker once we control for performance. Finally, we ￿nd that
administrative rigidities play an important role in explaining promotion dynamics.
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During the last decades great progress has been realized in understanding how ￿rms orga-
nize their employment relationships. Several theories of internal labor markets have been
developed taking a variety of di⁄erent perspectives: incentives under imperfect monitoring
of e⁄ort, learning about ability, ￿rm-speci￿c human capital accumulation, administrative
rigidities, etc. To establish the existence of internal labor markets, Doeringer and Piore
(1971) identify two essential conditions: ports of entry at low job levels and ports of exit at
high job levels in the hierarchy of the ￿rm, and wage paths that move independently from
external wages. Having established the existence of internal labor markets, one can test al-
ternative theories of internal labor markets by looking at the pattern of promotion dynamics
within the ￿rm. For example, incentive theories predict that performance plays an important
role in promotions, whereas learning theories predict dynamic patterns such as fast tracks
and the late beginner property (late beginners who catch up promote more quickly in the
future).
Recent empirical evidence from personnel data has shown support for both the existence
of internal labor markets and the relevance of several alternative theories. In an important
paper, Baker et al. (1994), henceforth BGH, collected a rich personnel data set of a single
￿rm and documented several facts consistent with internal labor market theories, such as
the presence of long careers with frequent one-step promotions. But they do not ￿nd strong
evidence of ports of entry or exit, i.e. entry and exit at all job levels appears to be common.
Subsequent work con￿rmed these ￿ndings, e.g. Treble et al. (2001) and Lazear and Oyer
(2004). Other work introduced new and richer internal labor market theories to explain
additional facts, e.g. Gibbons and Waldman (1999), DeVaro and Waldman (2006) and
many others. A general conclusion that can be drawn from the recent empirical evidence is
that (1) internal labor markets exist but typically not in the purest form of Doeringer and
Piore (1971), and (2) no single theory can explain all facts relating to internal promotion
dynamics.
In this paper we provide new evidence on the working of internal labor markets based
on a unique and very rich new personnel data set. We observe the personnel records of all
professors employed at a large European university during 1972￿ 2007. This analysis is of
interest for several reasons. First, the university we study has followed a set of administrative
rules that is much simpler than the personnel policies in many other companies: professors
can have only four possible ranks; they can be promoted to higher ranks in an annual
￿tournament￿ ; and wages conditional on rank follow deterministic seniority rules. Current
wage is therefore entirely determined by the starting rank, the starting seniority level and the
1speed of future promotions. The simplicity and clarity of the rules provide an ideal setting
to test the relevance of alternative labor market theories.
Second, in contrast with most other empirical work, we have good information on per-
formance (research and teaching). This does not only enable us to assess the relevance of
performance-based incentive theories of promotion dynamics. It also allows us to see whether
and to which extent learning theories of promotion dynamics, as documented in previous
work, remain empirically relevant after accounting for observed performance.
A third reason for studying this data set is to investigate to which extent internal labor
market theories also apply to universities. It is often believed that internal labor market
theories have little relevance to universities as human capital is assumed to be general [see
e.g. Lazear and Oyer (2004)].1 But several studies have recognized the role of mobility costs
at universities, so that human capital may also be ￿rm-speci￿c.2 Yet others would argue that
(European) universities have rigid administrative rules with little leeway to follow personnel
policies that are consistent with economic theories. Using our personnel data set, we are
able to document to which extent economic theories of internal labor markets are relevant
and to which extent administrative rigidities play a role.
Our main results can be summarized in two steps. First, we ￿nd strong evidence for
the presence of an internal labor market at this university. The lowest academic rank is a
strong port of entry, and in fact entry occurs at even earlier levels. The highest academic
rank is an important port of exit, and if exit occurs before it is mainly because of retirement.
Furthermore, wages are shielded from external wage evolutions since they are set according to
deterministic rules which have not been modi￿ed for many years. These facts are consistent
with Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Lazear and Oyer (2004) classi￿cation, and imply the
presence of a strong internal labor market, in fact much stronger than documented in the
earlier empirical work described above.
Second, having established the presence of an internal labor market, we assess the rele-
vance of alternative theories by looking at the dynamics of long careers within the university.
Consistent with incentive theories we ￿nd that observable performance plays an important
role: the number of publications, the impact of these publications and the teaching load all
1For example, Lazear and Oyer (2004) write that ￿human capital in academics, particularly at the research
end, is general, so movement into jobs even at high levels seems natural.￿
2For example, Ransom (1993) develops a model to explain that employees with high mobility costs will
have high seniority yet low pay if monopsonistic employers can discriminate. He ￿nds evidence that university
professors are indeed paid less when they have higher seniority. However, Hallock (1995) obtains opposite
empirical evidence based on data for one university (UMASS).
In a related sector (stock analysts), Groysberg et al. (2004) show the importance of various sources of
mobility costs leading to ￿rm-speci￿c human capital (such as internal networks, teams, leadership), which
can also be relevant to universities.
2a⁄ect the speed of promotions, though the policies di⁄er to an important extent between
the three main groups of the university (exact sciences, medical sciences and humanities).
Furthermore, after controlling for observed performance, theories of learning about ability
appear to play a less important role. If we do not control for observed performance, we
￿nd evidence of fast tracks and the late beginner property as predicted by learning theories:
professors have a higher promotion probability if they were quickly promoted into previous
ranks and especially if they were quickly promoted into their current rank. However, once
we control for research and teaching performance, the evidence for learning theories weak-
ens: the estimated magnitude of fast track e⁄ects becomes smaller but is still signi￿cant,
and the evidence for the late beginner property becomes weaker. We used a discrete-time
promotion hazard rate model of absolute performance evaluation to establish these ￿ndings
and our results are robust when we use a simple tournament model of relative performance
evaluation.3
In sum, we ￿nd much stronger evidence for the presence of an internal labor market
in the university we have analyzed than in the private companies that were analyzed in
other studies using personnel data. The evidence on promotion dynamics is consistent with
performance-based incentive theories, whereas learning theories play a less important role.
However, given that the university has been following its administrative rules quite rigidly
for a long time, it is not possible to rule out ine¢ ciencies in personnel policy. Since the
university landscape is changing rapidly, several rules may be in need of change, not only
at this university but also at many other European universities with similar administrative
rules and policies.
More concrete policy recommendations for university reform are, however, beyond the
scope of this paper. Further comparative analysis on other European and U.S. universities
would ￿rst be required. In this respect, it is useful to point out the results of two interesting
recent papers on university career dynamics (based on less detailed data sets for multiple
universities instead of the richer data set on a single university we use). Using a sample of top
1000 economists, CoupØ et al. (2006) ￿nd support for both incentive and learning theories,
but no evidence of internal labor markets. Oyer (2008) shows how updated expectations
about economists￿ability during the ￿rst career period may a⁄ect second period placement,
consistent with the learning model.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 provides theoretical background and
Section 3 presents the data set. After introducing the university￿ s personnel policies, Section
3Our ￿nding that the evidence for the learning model becomes weaker once we incorporate performance
measures is in the same spirit as Kahn and Lange (2009), although they use a di⁄erent approach. They ￿nd
that wage dynamics is predominantly explained by time-varying productivity rather than by learning.
34 documents the existence of internal labor markets: strong ports of entry and exit and the
implementation of wage rules independent of external market developments. Section 5 then
looks at the dynamics of careers to assess the relevance of speci￿c internal labor market
theories. Because we obtain many di⁄erent empirical results, we will summarize our main
empirical ￿ndings in various Observations.
2 Theoretical background
We provide a short review of theoretical work in personnel economics, focusing on the liter-
ature that is most relevant for our own empirical analysis. For more detailed overviews of
the literature we refer to Waldman (2007) and Lazear and Oyer (2007).
Suppose that ￿rms have perfect information about their workers￿e⁄orts and abilities, and
that human capital is general so that workers￿productivity does not depend on the ￿rm where
the worker is employed. Under these conditions, external labor markets can allocate labor
e¢ ciently. Workers can be paid on the spot market according to their marginal productivity.
There would be no need for long-term promotion schemes to encourage e⁄ort or uncover
ability, nor for long-term contracts to protect relation-speci￿c investments in human capital.
There would be no ports of entry and exit at ￿rms, so that careers would not necessarily be
long-term; and to the extent careers within the ￿rm are long term, wages would be strongly
correlated with external wages.
Theories of internal labor markets depart from the traditional competitive labor markets
because of two main features. First, within a ￿rm￿ s hierarchy there may be ports of entry at
low job levels and ports of exit at high levels. Second, wages within a ￿rm may move more
or less independently of external wages. These two conditions for the presence of an internal
labor market were ￿rst identi￿ed by Doeringer and Piore (1971), and they have subsequently
been investigated in other empirical work. While these conditions establish the presence of
internal labor markets, they do not say which theory of the internal labor market is most
relevant. To test the relevance of speci￿c theories, one can look at testable predictions about
internal promotion dynamics of alternative theories. We will distinguish between three main
classes of internal labor market theories and their empirical predictions.
A ￿rst class of relevant models focuses on the provision of optimal incentives under
imperfect observability of e⁄ort. Holmstrom (1979) model starts from the basic trade-o⁄
between insurance and incentives. The model predicts that workers receive part of their pay
as a ￿xed amount and part of their pay according to their realized performance. Lazear and
Rosen (1981) propose a tournament theory of promotions. E⁄ort is unobservable so that
good performance may be either due to high e⁄ort or good luck. Workers start at low levels
4and low wages and will be promoted to higher levels if they perform better than other workers
at the same level. The spread between wages at two di⁄erent levels is the prize of winning
the tournament and serves to induce an optimal e⁄ort level. The optimal spread will be
higher in uncertain environments where luck is important. Tournaments create potentially
great informational advantages compared with other work incentive contracts, since it is
only necessary to provide an ordinal ranking of the employees. Tournament theory has
been extended in many directions. For example, Nalebu⁄ and Stiglitz (1983) consider risk-
averse employees and Rosen (1986) considers multiple elimination tournaments, showing the
importance of concentrating prizes among few participants at each round.
A second class of models focuses on learning about workers￿productivity or ability. Harris
and Holstrom (1982) develop a model of symmetric learning, where both ￿rms and workers
have little information about the workers￿ability at the start of a relationship and gradually
learn about ability by observing output over time. Firms are risk neutral and workers
are risk averse about how beliefs regarding their ability will evolve. The model predicts a
downward rigid real wage path to partially insure workers. It also predicts fast tracks, i.e.
employees who were promoted more quickly from level 1 to level 2 are more likely to be
promoted quickly to level 3.4 Chiappori et al. (1999) derive another interesting prediction
from the learning model: the late-beginner property. Consider two workers A and B who
were promoted equally quickly from level 1 to level 3, but worker A was promoted more
quickly to level 2 than worker B. Hence, as shown in Figure 1, worker A was an early starter
and B was a late beginner who was able to catch up. The learning model predicts that
the late beginner B is more likely to be promoted to level 4. Intuitively, the late beginner
had bad luck at the start. From the fact that he was still able to catch up one can infer
that his average performance between level 1 and level 3 was higher, so that his perceived
future ability is higher. In Section 5, where we conduct our empirical work, we show that
the fast track and late-beginner property can be combined to give the following equivalent
predictions: the speed of the most recent promotion (to level 3) has a positive impact on the
probability of a new promotion (to level 4), and this impact is stronger than the impact of
the speed of older promotions (to level 2).
A third class of models that predict ports of entry and wages shielded from external wages
looks at models with ￿rm-speci￿c human capital [Becker (1962)].5 If workers accumulate
￿rm-speci￿c human capital, a situation of bilateral monopoly arises, so that workers￿wages
4Farber and Gibbons (1996) develop a symmetric and public learning model, without long-term con-
tracting. They obtain somewhat di⁄erent testable predictions about wage dynamics, for example unobserved
ability should increasingly be correlated with wages as experience increases.
5Gibbons and Waldman (1999) develop a rich model that incorporates both human capital accumulation,
learning and job assignment. The model is consistent with many empirical ￿ndings on promotion dynamics.
5do not need to correspond to competitive wages. Workers may be expected to enter at low
levels and move up when they have acquired more human capital inside the ￿rm. A speci￿c
prediction of these models is that external entrants into a job level may perform worse than
internally promoted workers and that the variance in performance is higher.
3 The data set
The university we study is a large European university, currently ranked in the top 100 of
the QS World University Rankings. Our data set consists of the personnel records of all
professors employed over a 35 years period from 1972 to 2007. There is a small but growing
empirical literature using personnel records of individual ￿rms at this level of detail. Lazear
(1990) observes a large ￿rm for thirteen years. Baker et al. (1994) follow a medium-sized
U.S. services ￿rm during the period 1969￿ 1988. Treble et al. (2001) observe a large British
￿nancial services ￿rm during 1989￿ 1997. Chiappori et al. (1999) study a French state-owned
company during the period 1960￿ 1982. Lazear and Oyer (2004) collected a standardized
data set of personnel records of multiple unionized Swedish ￿rms.
Our own data set is unique because it covers a very long time period, it considers a
university where personnel rules are particularly clear and simple, and it contains information
on the key performance variables of employees: research and teaching. We ￿rst provide an
overview of the data set and then discuss summary statistics.
3.1 Overview
Figure 2 describes the evolution of the number of professors in the university, including both
the total number and the numbers broken down by the three university groups: medical
sciences, exact sciences and humanities (including social sciences). During our sample period
1972￿ 2007, the number of professors nearly tripled from approximately 500 to almost 1500.
The growth in employment took place in all three groups, but it was more pronounced in
medical and exact sciences than in humanities. Although the growth in employment has been
considerable, it does not match the even greater growth in student numbers. Between 1992￿
2007 the number of students increased by 41% (from 26,087 to 36,768), while the number of
professors increased by only 27% (from 1,144 to 1,456).
The personnel data set records the employment information of all professors at the start
of each academic year (October 1st). Professors may have four possible ranks, ranging from
assistant professor to full professor, and they may either have an untenured or a tenured
status. We observe 2,691 di⁄erent professors at some point in time over 1972-2007. Over
6this period we have a total of 36,284 employee-year records, yielding an average number of
professors per year of 1,037 and an average observed employment duration in professorship
of 13.5 years. Many professors were already employed at the university before entering
professorship, as a pre-doctoral and/or post-doctoral employee. The average observed total
employment duration at the university is therefore longer and amounts to 18 years.
The personnel records contain the following information for each professor: anonymous
identi￿cation code, age, sex, nationality, current academic year, a¢ liation within the organi-
zation (university group, faculty, department), academic rank, tenure status, part-time ap-
pointment status, seniority and employment history (previous academic ranks, pre-doctoral
and post-doctoral positions, year and location of Ph.D., age at entry).
We matched the personnel data set with two additional data sets on performance pro-
vided by the university. The ￿rst additional data set includes teaching load and selected
management duties (such as dean or department head). This information is recorded at the
end of the academic year. The second additional data set contains two measures of research
performance: number of publications and average impact factor per year. We have three dif-
ferent sources. First, we have the Science Citation Index Expanded (SCIE) measures for the
period 1991￿ 2006. SCIE primarily accounts for publications in exact sciences and medical
sciences. Second, we have the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) measures for 1997￿ 2006.
The SSCI measures combine publications from both the Social Science Citation Index and
the Arts and Humanities Citation Index (AHCI), but we will refer to it as SSCI for simplic-
ity. SSCI mainly accounts for publications in psychology and economics, and not so much in
other ￿elds such as literature and philosophy, where professors publish elsewhere6. Third, we
have the Proceedings measure for 1996￿ 2006. Proceedings counts the number of publications
related to conferences (ISI Proceedings) and mainly accounts for publications in engineer-
ing (exact sciences) with a bias towards American conferences. All research performance
measures are calculated based on the publication date from January to December.
Table 1 provides a de￿nition of the main variables.
3.2 Summary statistics
Table 2 shows the number of observations (professor-years) and the averages of our main
variables, for the entire period 1972￿ 2007 and the subperiod 1991-2007. Table 2 shows that
there is complete or almost complete information since 1972 for the most commonly used
personnel variables: the number of observations is equal or close to 36,284 for the variables
6SSCI has been corrected to ensure that publications counted in SCIE are not also counted in SSCI. The
impact factor in both SSCI and SCIE is based on the number of citations within SSCI and SCIE. If the
paper is cited elsewhere it is not counted.
7age, sex, nationality, group a¢ liation and most contract characteristics (dummy variables
for rank, part-time appointment and tenure status).
There is, however, less complete information for the teaching and research performance
variables (which come from di⁄erent data sets as discussed above). First, information on
teaching load and management tasks is only available since 1980. Second, information on
publication performance (number of publications and average impact factor) is only available
since 1991 for SCIE data, and since 1997 for SSCI and 1996 for ISI Proceedings. Finally,
there is also a non-negligible number of missing observations for Ph.D. location and we only
observe seniority on a systematic basis since 1999. But if we limit our attention to the period
1991￿ 2007, the information is quite complete for most variables. For this reason, and the
fact that there was a change in personnel policy at the beginning of the 1990 (as discussed
below), we will concentrate part of our empirical analysis on the period 1991-2007.
It is instructive to look at the variable means in Table 2. For example, only 9% of the
professors were women over the entire period 1972-2007, though the fraction was higher at
13% during the period 1991￿ 2007 (compared with about 3% before 1991). A professor￿ s
average age was more or less constant at 49 years over all periods. Only a small minority
of professors has a foreign nationality (less than 4%) and a Ph.D. from another university
(less than 14%). The entrant type variables show that only 18% of the professor-years were
external hires, i.e. they did not have an employment history at the university prior to
entering in one of the academic ranks. This fraction is even lower for the period since 1991
(15%). Similarly, only 6% of the professor-years are entrants in rank 2 and only 4% are
entrants in rank 3; the vast majority of observations are entrants from the lowest rank 1.
Table 2 also summarizes several aspects of the employment contract. Since 1991 pro-
fessors are spread more or less evenly across the three university groups, with 34% of the
professor-years in humanities, 35% in medical sciences and 30% in exact sciences. This used
to be di⁄erent in the earlier decades, when professors in humanities outnumbered professors
in other university groups (with about 46% of the positions during 1972￿ 1979 and 45% of
the positions during 1980￿ 1990). Up to 41% of the professor-years are in the highest of
four possible academic ranks. However this share has decreased in more recent years, with
33% in the highest rank 4 for the period 1991￿ 2007. The large majority of professor-years
is tenured (84%), and this is true for both the entire period and the period since 1991. A
particular feature of the university is the number of part-time appointments. About 30% of
the professor-year observations refer to part-time appointments.
The bottom part of Table 2 summarizes performance information. The average teaching
load is 5.1 week-hours over the entire period and 4.6 week-hours during 1991￿ 2007, where
one week-hour roughly corresponds to 26￿ 30 hours of teaching. The number of management
8duties has been stable at 0.3 per professor. The average number of publications (cumulative
annual average over 5 years) was 2.5 in SCIE, 0.1 in SSCI and 0.3 in Proceedings. But these
averages hide important performance di⁄erences between the three main university groups.
Table 3 shows that teaching load has been comparable for professors in exact sciences and
humanities (about 5 week-hours), but considerably lower in medical sciences (3.4 week-
hours). The annual number of SCIE publications is highest in medical sciences (4.5) and
exact sciences (3.1), while it is small in humanities. Conversely, the number of publications
in SSCI is highest in humanities (0.3), but there is a high standard deviation (0.6), in part
because these publications are only relevant for social science ￿elds and much less for other
￿elds such as literature or philosophy.
A separate Appendix provides additional summary statistics of the data set. First, it
presents a more detailed version of Table 2, with additional subperiods 1972-1979 and 1980-
1990. Second, it shows several ￿gures documenting the evolution of the percentage of women,
foreigners and outside PhDs since 1972; the evolution of teaching load since 1980; and the
evolution of research performance since 1991.
4 The university as an internal labor market
In this section we show that Doeringer and Piore￿ s (1971) two conditions for an internal
labor market are satis￿ed to a much stronger degree for this university than for ￿rms in
other empirical studies. First, we describe the university￿ s hiring and promotion policy. We
establish the presence of a strong port of entry at the lowest rank and a somewhat less
strong port of exit at the highest rank, implying long internal careers. Next, we discuss the
university￿ s wage policy. We ￿nd that wages conditional on rank are largely deterministic
and thus independent from external in￿ uences.
In the next section we will examine more closely the dynamics of long careers within the
university to assess the relevance of alternative speci￿c theories of internal labor markets.
To facilitate the reading, we will summarize the main results of these sections in various
Observations.
4.1 Hiring and promotion policy
4.1.1 Administrative rules
The university￿ s personnel policy follows a set of administrative rules that are partly based
on a government decree and partly based on internal rules. Professors may be appointed in
one of four possible academic ranks, ranging from rank 1 (assistant professor), ranks 2 and
93 (associate professor) to rank 4 (full professor). They may either have an untenured status
or a tenured status (permanent contract). In recent years untenured positions typically
resulted in a tenure decision after three years. Professors may have a part-time or a full-time
appointment. If they have a full-time appointment, they are entitled to become part-time on
a temporary basis for a total of eight years during their career.
The government restricts the maximum number of professors that can be hired relative
to the number of other employees (technical sta⁄and Ph.D. students). This has implications
for the university￿ s hiring and promotion policies. Every year the university decides on the
number of new academic openings that may be ￿lled, with detailed speci￿cations per opening.
Furthermore, every year the university makes available a maximum number of promotions
per academic rank and per university group. Promotions are granted through an annual
￿tournament￿ . Applications for promotion are reviewed based on three main performance
criteria: research, teaching and management duties. The ranking of candidates is initially
made at the faculty level, and subsequently aggregated to the level of the three university
groups. University rules stipulate that professors can typically only be promoted one rank
higher, and should stay at least two/three full years within a rank before being eligible to
apply for a next promotion. Promotion decisions become e⁄ective on October 1st of each
academic year.
4.1.2 Structure and stability of the hierarchy
Previous personnel studies looked at private companies and stressed that the structure of the
hierarchy looks complicated at ￿rst, but ultimately reduces to a fairly simple structure with
between 4 to 8 job ranks [see for example BGH and Treble et al. (2001)]. In the university we
study, the hierarchy is even simpler as there are only four academic ranks. Figure 3 shows
the structure of the hierarchy at several points in time. Unlike other studies, it suggests
that there was no real ￿structural stability￿in the hierarchy. This is however due to a major
reform in the ranking system in 1991. Before 1991 (top panel) rank 2 did not yet exist, and
most professors were either in the lowest rank 1 or in the highest rank 4. The reform in 1991
split rank 1 into two ranks, rank 1 and rank 2. This reform led to a more even distribution
of professors across the four ranks with a slightly inverse pyramid structure, as illustrated by
the years 1993 and 2003. The relative number of professors remained stable for the period
1993 to 2007, with only a tendency for rank 3 to gain in relative importance.7
We can summarize these ￿ndings as follows:
7In 2007, the last year of our study, the hierarchy had an inverse pyramid structure that was extremely
similar to 2003.
10Observation 1 The university￿ s hierarchy is simple and is relatively stable within the
subperiods 1972￿ 1990 and 1991￿ 2007.
We focus our subsequent discussion on the subperiod 1991￿ 2007.8 This is not only because
this period is stable relative to the period before the reform in the ranking system but
also because we have more information on performance, as discussed before. Nevertheless,
where applicable, we also provide more detailed results on other subperiods in the separate
Appendix.
4.1.3 Ports of entry and exit, and long-term careers
Insights into the hiring and promotion policies are obtained from looking at the number of
annual job transitions. Extending BGH￿ s Table I, we present a job transition matrix for the
period 1991￿ 2007 in Table 4.
Row 4 of the transition matrix (Total Entry) shows that most entry occurs in the lowest
rank: there were 948 entrants in rank 1. Entry in rank 2 was considerably less important
and entry in rank 3 and 4 was very rare. Rows 1 to 3 of the transition matrix distinguish
between three types of entry. ￿Internal entry￿refers to entrants into the professor ranks
by individuals who previously held a non-professor position at the same university (Ph.D.
students, post-doctoral researchers or visiting lecturers). ￿Delayed internal entry￿is similar,
but with the quali￿cation that the individual was employed elsewhere for an intermediate
period. Finally, ￿external entry￿ is a transition into professorship by an individual who
was never employed at the university before. Most entry is internal: there are 767 internal
entrants (into any rank), compared to 238 delayed internal entrants and only 260 external
entrants. External entry is comparatively more important in the highest ranks 3 and 4, but
it is rare in absolute terms.
In sum, we have:
Observation 2 The lowest rank 1 is a strong port of entry. In fact, the port of entry mostly
takes place prior to professorship.
It is interesting to contrast this with CoupØ et al. (2006), who ￿nd evidence of upward
mobility (to higher ranked universities) in response to past performance. This may indicate
that ports of entry are less important in U.S. than in European universities. Alternatively,
their di⁄erent ￿nding may be due to the fact that they focus on a sample of top economists,
8Our results are very similar for alternative subperiods, e.g. 1993￿ 2007 where we exclude the ￿rst years
after the reform.
11whereas we consider the complete personnel records of a university. Further research on U.S.
and European universities would be interesting to shed further light on this.
Columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 show exits from the various ranks. There is a small group of
professors who temporarily exit (Temp Out column) to come back later in one of the four
ranks (Temp Out row). Permanent exit (Total Exit column) most frequently occurs at the
highest rank 4 (386 out of 827 cases), but there has also been a non-negligible number of
exits from the other ranks (151+165+125=441 cases in total). To further understand the
sources of exit, columns 7 to 9 break the exit down in three possibilities. ￿Early exit￿is
exit before the age of 60, ￿early retirement￿is between 60 and 65, and retirement is at the
age of 65. Other work has not taken into account that exit may be due to retirement. The
table shows that most exit is through retirement or early retirement (447+171=618 out of
827 cases) and much less because of early exit (209 cases). Exit from rank 1 is mainly early
exit because tenure was not given (103 out of 151 cases), but exit from ranks 2, 3 and 4 are
mainly because of retirement or early retirement.
In sum, we can conclude:
Observation 3 The highest rank 4 is an important port of exit. If exit occurs at the lower
ranks 2 and 3, it is mainly because retirement age has already been reached.
Observations 2 and 3 are in stark contrast with other personnel studies, such as Lazear
(1990), BGH or Treble et al. (2001) who observe considerably more ￿late entry￿and ￿early
exit￿ . Furthermore, we ￿nd that entry in fact occurs at even earlier levels than rank 1 (a
￿nding that is not applicable to these other studies) and we are able to distinguish between
the sources of exit (true early exit versus retirement).
The intersection of rows 5￿ 8 and columns 1￿ 4 shows the career transitions of professors
employed in one of the four academic ranks. Non-promotions or stays are on the ￿diagonal￿
(starting from the ￿fth row onwards), promotions are to the right of this diagonal and
demotions are to the left. Stays are most commonly observed. For example, there are 3,818
cases of professors staying in rank 1 at some year. Promotions are almost always one-rank
promotions, e.g. 616 promotions from rank 1 to 2. There were only 19 promotions of two
ranks. Demotions are essentially non-existent (only 1 case).
Recalling our earlier discussion on the promotion rules, we can conclude:
Observation 4 The administrative promotion rules are largely followed; almost all promo-
tions are one-step promotions.
12Table 5 gives further insights into entry, exit and career characteristics, following a struc-
ture similar to BGH￿ s Table II on career and rank characteristics.
The top panel of Table 5 considers all professor-years between 1991 and 2006 to focus
on entry and exit patterns. The bottom panel limits attention to only the professors that
were hired between 1991 and 1999. Following BGH, this enables us to follow the length and
number of ranks in their subsequent careers and avoid censoring problems when we would
also include the 2000￿ 2007 hires.
The top panel con￿rms our ￿nding that rank 1 is a strong port of entry. Only 21.5%
of those entering rank 2 were newly hired rather than promoted from rank 1. New hires
are even less important than promotions at ranks 3 and 4 (7.8% and 6.8% respectively).9
Furthermore, among the newly hired professors the large majority are internal hires, i.e.
with a prior employment history at the university (￿internal entrants￿or ￿delayed internal
entrants￿in our earlier terminology). Up to 84.5% of rank 1 new hires were internal hires and
similar large proportions apply to rank 2 hires. In sum, these ￿ndings con￿rm Observation
2 that there is a strong port of entry at the lowest rank (i.e. rank 1), and in fact at earlier
points before entering professorship.
The top part of Table 5 also con￿rms our earlier Observation 3 that the highest rank
is a relatively strong port of exit, and that the majority of exits at ranks 2 to 4 is due to
retirement. Only at rank 1 are there more early exits than retirements (because of non-tenure
decisions).
The bottom panel of Table 5 shows how careers of professors hired between 1991￿ 1999
developed during the entire period 1991￿ 2007. Careers last very long: over 84% of professors
hired in rank 1 and 81% of professors hired in rank 2 had careers of at least eight years.
Careers of professors hired in the higher ranks (3 and 4) tend to be somewhat shorter: 58% of
rank 3 hires and 69% of rank 4 hires are still at the university after eight years. This is largely
due to the higher age at which they enter professorship. Furthermore, most entrants into
professorship have a long prior employment history at the university (e.g. Ph.D. student or
postdoctoral researcher), about 8 years on average. In sum, careers tend to be substantially
longer than documented in BGH￿ s comparable Table II.
Careers are not only very long, they also show steady progress. Of the professors with
lengthy careers (more than 8 years), only 18% of the rank 1 hires did not promote to a higher
rank; 28% promoted one rank, 26% two ranks and the remaining 29% even three ranks up to
the highest rank. The majority of rank 2 or 3 professors also promoted to the highest rank.
We can summarize these ￿ndings as follows.
9The percentages of newly hired are in line with the 1991-2007 transition matrix (Table 4) but are not
exactly the same because the period is slightly di⁄erent.
13Observation 5 Careers within the university are very long, and they show steady progress
to higher ranks.
4.2 Wage policy
We now discuss the wage policy of the university. As noted by Aghion et al. (2007), there
is no wage autonomy in many European universities, including Belgium, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Spain and Switzerland. In the university we study wages also follow deterministic
rules. The current system has not been modi￿ed since 1991 and it includes an automatic
wage indexation to compensate for in￿ ation.
Wages are based on the professor￿ s current academic rank and his seniority within the
rank. Each of the four academic ranks has a separate salary scale. Every year of employment
results in an additional seniority step. If a cycle of three steps is completed, the salary
increases to a new level and a new three-step cycle begins. When a professor is promoted to
a higher academic rank, he receives a wage according to the new salary scale. The number of
seniority steps in his new rank will be the lowest number such that (1) the wage is not lower
than without the promotion and (2) the position within the three-step cycle is maintained.
For example, a professor who is currently in the second year of a three-step cycle will upon
promotion move to the third year of the cycle in the new rank that gives at least the same
wage.
These seniority rules imply that a professor￿ s wage path essentially depends on the fol-
lowing elements: the rank at entry, the number of seniority steps negotiated at entry, and
the timing of subsequent promotions. Figure 4 shows the salary scales for the four ranks.
The salary of a professor in rank 1 with zero years of seniority is normalized to 100. One
can clearly see how wages increase after a three-year cycle is completed. To illustrate how
promotion a⁄ects wages, the bold line shows the salary path of a professor who enters in
rank 1 with zero years of seniority and who is promoted to the next rank after ￿ve years. It
would take this professor 27 years for the (real) wage to increase from 100 to 230.
In sum, the wage path within a rank and between ranks is consistent with Gibbons and
Waldman￿ s (1999) summary:
Observation 6 Wage increases upon promotion are large, but they are small relative to
long-term wage increases within a rank.
One may wonder whether the university strictly applies these administrative rules in
practice, or whether it has discretion by setting higher or lower seniority steps than implied
14by the rules. Table 6 addresses this question. It compares a professor￿ s actual seniority
step with the seniority step he would have obtained if the administrative rules were strictly
followed.
The top panel shows the results of this comparison for professors in years when they did
not receive a promotion to a higher rank. This shows that the professor￿ s seniority follows
the administrative rules in 93.3% of the cases. Upward or downward deviations by more
than 2 seniority steps are very rare (0.2% of all cases, not shown in the table). Most of the
1-step or 2-step deviations are upward and occur in rank 3.
The bottom panel of Table 6 shows the comparison for professors in years when they were
promoted to a higher rank. This shows that the administrative rules are respected in a much
smaller fraction of only 50.4% of the cases. Nevertheless, upward or downward promotions
by more than 2 seniority steps are still uncommon (2% of all cases). Quite remarkably,
deviations from administrative rules are most commonly downward deviations (by 1 or 2
steps). This may indicate that time of promotion is used to adjust an initially ￿incorrect￿
seniority level. More importantly, cases where professors get more than the administrative
rules are rare. These ￿ndings indicate that the university follows the seniority rules very
closely. Since the system has not been modi￿ed since 1991, this indicates that wages move
independently from external wages.
We can summarize this discussion into the following counterpart of Observation 4, which
relates to promotion policies.
Observation 7 The administrative wage policies are largely followed: seniority steps are
mostly at the right level or deviate by only a small amount. Since the policies have been in
place for a long time, this implies wages are shielded from the external wage evolution.
5 Internal career dynamics
The evidence in the previous section indicates that Doeringer and Piore￿ s two main conditions
for internal labor markets are satis￿ed: the existence of strong ports of entry and exit, and
wages that follow rules independent of external market developments. In this section we now
go deeper into the speci￿c career dynamics of professors to assess which particular internal
labor market theories are most relevant. We ￿rst follow BGH and present descriptive non-
parametric promotion hazard rates conditional on the number of years in previous ranks.
We subsequently extend this analysis to estimate a semi-parametric hazard rate model of
promotion. This enables us to test predictions of the learning model of promotions and
15incorporate the importance of observed performance.
As in the previous section, we will again summarize our main ￿ndings in various Observa-
tions. While the non-parametric promotion hazard rates of section 5.1 already suggest some
￿rst tendencies, we postpone the main Observations until we have estimated the complete
hazard rate model in section 5.3.
5.1 Promotion hazard rates
The promotion hazard rate is the probability of promotion conditional on not being promoted
before. How does the promotion hazard rate evolve over time? Does it show an increasing,
constant or decreasing pattern? Furthermore, how does the promotion rate depend on the
speed of promotions into previous ranks? Are there fast tracks, i.e. are promotion rates
higher for individuals who were promoted quickly to a previous rank? This may be expected
if there is learning about ability. But if ￿rm-speci￿c human capital accumulation rather than
learning is important, the opposite may hold: professors who were promoted quickly to a
previous rank accumulated less human capital and would therefore have a lower probability
to be promoted quickly again.
Table 7 presents the promotion hazard rates of professors currently in rank 2 (top panel)
or rank 3 (bottom panel)10. The promotion hazard rates are shown conditional on the
duration in the current rank (columns) and on the duration in the previous rank (rows).
The ￿nal row of each panel (￿All￿ ) shows the traditional promotion rates, unconditional on
the duration in the previous rank. The table corresponds to BGH￿ s Table IV, but we only
present the promotion rates and not the exit rates, since these are considerably smaller (as
documented earlier) and show little variation.
Consider professors who are currently in rank 2 (top panel of Table 7). The promotion
rates unconditional on duration in previous rank (￿nal row) are very low for the ￿rst two
years in the current rank (0% and 3%). This re￿ ects the university￿ s administrative rules
stipulating that promotion is not possible during the ￿rst two years. The promotion rates
increase sharply during the next two years (to 25% and 26%) and gradually decline after-
wards. This inverse U-shaped pattern suggests that the administrative rule not to promote
in the ￿rst two years upon a previous promotion is an e⁄ective constraint on the university￿ s
performance-based personnel policy. We will con￿rm this ￿nding below where we include
10In this section we restrict our attention to professors whose career was not impacted by the 1991 ranking
system reform (i.e. introduction of rank 2). This essentially means we exclude professors promoted to rank 3
and 4 prior to the reform and professors promoted to rank 2 in the ￿rst year of the reform. So we e⁄ectively
exclude all observations for professors whose time spent in rank 1 and/or rank 2 may be biased due to the
reform.
16performance measures into the model.
Reading the top panel of Table 7 down the columns indicates that current promotion
rates tend to be highest for professors who stay 3 years in the previous rank: these are the
professors who were promoted to the previous rank as soon as they became eligible according
to the administrative restrictions. The promotions rates subsequently tend to decrease as
the duration in the previous rank increases. This is a ￿rst evidence of the existence of fast
tracks. For example, consider the third column with professors who are 3 years in the current
rank. The average hazard rate of promotion of these professors is 25%. The hazard rate of
the subset of professors who stayed 3 years in the previous rank is 41%, much higher than
the average. It is 37% for professors who stayed 4 years in the previous rank and shows a
further tendency to decline for professors who stayed even longer in the previous rank. The
fourth column con￿rms this pattern: the promotion rate is highest for professors who stayed
3 years in the previous rank (39%) and it subsequently declines.11
The bottom panel reveals similar patterns for professors currently in rank 3. First, the
hazard rate is essentially zero during the ￿rst two years, it sharply increases to 30% in the
next year and it gradually declines. Second, the columns show evidence of fast tracks, with
the highest promotion rates for professors who stayed 2￿ 3 years in the previous rank and
lower rates for professors with slower earlier progress.
We can summarize these preliminary descriptive ￿ndings on promotion dynamics as fol-
lows. First, the inverse U-shaped pattern of promotion rates (initially very low, then sharply
increasing and subsequently decreasing) suggests the importance of institutional constraints
in granting promotion during the ￿rst years. Second, the fact that promotion rates decline
with duration in previous rank suggests some ￿rst evidence of fast tracks. This is consistent
with learning models of internal labor markets and not with models of ￿rm-speci￿c human
capital accumulation, according to which fast progress in previous rank indicates little human
capital accumulation and thus a low subsequent promotion probability.
The promotion hazard rate results in Table 7 are only preliminary evidence. The patterns
are not always that clear for cases with a limited number of observations. Furthermore, Table
7 only showed dependence of promotion rates on duration in current and previous ranks. But
learning models also make predictions about the dependence on duration in earlier ranks,
i.e. Chiappori et al. (1999)￿ s late-beginner property. Finally, the results in Table 7 did not
control for observed performance determinants of promotion. To take these elements into
account, the next subsection extends BGH￿ s analysis and estimates a semi-parametric hazard
rate model for promotions.
11There is also declining pattern of promotion rates from the third year of duration in previous rank for
the other columns, but because of the smaller number of observations, the pattern is less strong.
175.2 A discrete-time hazard rate model for promotions
Since the promotion process is truly discrete in our application, we consider a discrete-time
semi-parametric hazard rate model of promotion. The model allows the hazard rate to depend
in a fully ￿ exible way on time in the current rank. More speci￿cally, de￿ne the hazard rate
hr
jt as the probability that professor j who is currently in rank r promotes to the next rank
r + 1 at time T r








j > t;xjt] (1)
=
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1 + exp(￿￿r(t) ￿ vr
jt)
:
The logistic speci￿cation ensures that the hazard rate lies between 0 and 1. If one would want
to specify a proportional hazard rate, the log-log model would be more appropriate [Holford
(1976) and Prentice and Gloeckler (1978)]. Nevertheless, the logistic model converges to a
proportional hazard model as the time interval becomes small [Thompson (1977)].
The hazard rate depends on time and on other variables. First, the hazard rate depends
on time through the function ￿r(t). One may specify functions that are increasing or de-
creasing in time.12 Alternatively, one may specify the time dependence semi-parametrically
by including a full set of time in rank e⁄ects ￿r
t (t = 1;2;￿￿￿). Given that institutional
constraints may a⁄ect the probabilities of promotion di⁄erently in the ￿rst years, we follow
the semi-parametric approach here.
Second, the hazard rate depends on other variables through vr
jt. We consider three sets
of variables: durations in previous ranks, teaching and research performance, and individual
and contract characteristics. To illustrate, consider the following speci￿cation for professors














PERFjt is a vector of teaching and research performance variables. Teaching performance is
teaching load. Research performance is the annual average number of publications and im-
pact over the last 5 years.13 Since Table 3 documented that performance di⁄ers substantially
12For example, in the proportional log-log hazard rate model, one could specify ￿r(t) = ￿0 + ￿1 logt, to
have the well-known Weibull model.
13The university evaluates research based on the last ￿ve years. Since we only observe publications since
1991, we cannot take the average of the last ￿ve years for the ￿rst years in our data set. We therefore took
the average over the longest available period up to a maximum of ￿ve years. Our results are robust when we
use alternative measures, e.g. publications during the current academic year.
18across the three groups (humanities, exact and medical sciences), we interact both teaching
and research performance by group dummy variables.
OTHERjt refers to individual characteristics such as sex, nationality and Ph.D. origin,
and contract characteristics such as tenure and full-time status. It also includes rank cohort
e⁄ects, which refer to the academic year at which previous promotion took place. The rank
cohort e⁄ects capture the possibility that the number of promotion slots was lower during
certain years because of government restrictions or budget cuts.
Finally, DUR1
j and DUR2
j are state variables entering the hazard rate: DUR1
j is the
duration in rank 1, and DUR2





2 enable us to assess the relevance of the learning models of Harris and Holstrom
(1982) and Chiappori et al. (1999). First, as discussed in section 2, the model of symmetric
learning about workers￿ability predicts the presence of fast tracks, i.e. professors who were
quickly promoted to previous ranks have a higher probability of being promoted to the next
rank. This means that ￿
3
1 < 0 and ￿
3
2 < 0: promotion is more likely the shorter the duration
in rank 1 or rank 2, holding constant the duration in other ranks. Second, the learning
model predicts the late beginner property: holding constant total duration in rank 1 and 2
(DUR1
j + DUR2
j) the promotion is more likely for a professor with a high duration in rank
1 (DUR1
j), i.e. a late beginner. To see what this implies for the parameters, it is convenient


























According to the late beginner property, DUR1
j has a positive impact on the promotion
probability to rank 3, holding constant DUR1
j +DUR2




2 > 0. Combining the





Intuitively, the duration in the most recent rank 2 has the strongest negative e⁄ect on the
probability of promotion. The duration in the earlier rank 1 has a weaker but still negative
e⁄ect.15
More generally, we specify the variable vr

























14The duration in previous states has been included in other applications. For example, Heckman et al.
(1985) include the time between two births in the hazard rate for an additional birth.
15Our empirical approach to test the late-beginner property di⁄ers from Chiappori et al. (1999). We test
it directly using duration in previous ranks, whereas they ￿rst classify individuals into categories of early
starters and late beginners prior to estimation.
19where DUR0
j refers to the duration at the university prior to entering professorship (i.e. as
a Ph.D. or postdoc) and AGEj refers to age at earliest entry in the university. The learning




r￿2 < ￿￿￿ < ￿
r
￿1 < 0: professors with long durations in previous
ranks have a lower probability of being promoted and the negative e⁄ects are strongest for
the most recent durations.
Remark that our earlier analysis in section 4 showed that a large fraction of professors
were internal entrants already employed at the university before entering rank 1. For these
professors all duration variables are positive. But there are also external entrants at rank
1, for whom DUR0
j = 0, or professors entering at ranks 2 or 3, for whom DUR1
j = 0
and/or DUR2
j = 0. These zero durations may have di⁄erent e⁄ects from positive but small
durations. To account for this, we include three dummy variables for the types of entrants:
external, rank 2 and rank 3 entrants.
We estimate the model using maximum likelihood. We take into account that our data
are censored because the data set ends in 2007: for individuals that have not yet achieved
the highest rank we therefore do not observe their complete duration in ranks history. This
is a situation of independent censoring, since all individuals stopped being observed in 2007,
regardless of their promotion probability. As ￿rst noted by Brown (1975) and further de-
veloped by Allison (1982), it is possible to simplify the likelihood function so that it can
be estimated as a binary dependent variable model after suitably organizing the data set.16
With this data set and the hazard speci￿cation (1), the model can be estimated as a simple
binary logit model.
5.3 Empirical results
We ￿rst estimated the logistic hazard rate model (1) with only the time in current rank
e⁄ects (￿r
t) and no other covariates. This model exactly replicates the inverse U-shaped
pattern of the promotion rates as reported earlier in the ￿All￿row of Table 7, with the very
low promotion rates during the ￿rst two years because of the administrative restrictions.17
This model furthermore establishes that the inverse U-shaped pattern is highly signi￿cant,
rejecting speci￿cation with a constant or a monotone increasing or decreasing hazard rate.
We next extended the model to include duration in previous rank e⁄ects (DUR) and
individual and contract characteristics (OTHER), but not yet the performance measures
(Table 8). Finally, in Table 9, we estimated the complete model, which also includes the
16First, organize the data set such that every observation is an individual-year. Then, for each rank, de￿ne
a binary dependent variable equal to zero if promotion did not occur and equal to 1 when promotion occurs.
17The logistic model can also replicate the other promotion rates in Table 7 by interacting the time in
rank e⁄ects ￿r
t with time in previous rank e⁄ects.
20teaching and research performance measures (PERF)18.
Table 8, as mentioned above, presents the empirical results of the hazard rate model (1)
with duration in previous rank e⁄ects, and individual and contract characteristics, but not
yet the performance measures. Several of the individual and contract characteristics play
a signi￿cant role. Women in rank 1 and 3 tend to have a signi￿cantly lower probability
of promoting to the next level. The same holds for foreigners in rank 2. The origin of the
Ph.D. degree plays a mixed role. For example, a Ph.D. degree from a foreign university
has a positive impact on the probability of promotion to rank 2, but not on the promotion
probabilities to higher ranks (suggesting that general human capital acquired abroad may
only play a short-term role). Part-time professors have a signi￿cantly lower promotion prob-
ability in all three ranks, whereas tenured professors have a signi￿cantly higher promotion
probability in all three ranks. External entrants (i.e. professors who were not employed at
the university before entering professorship) have a signi￿cantly higher promotion probabil-
ity when they are in rank 2, but not when they are in other ranks. Professors who skipped
rank 1 as the port of entry and immediately entered in rank 2 or 3 have a signi￿cantly lower
probability of being promoted than professors who entered in rank 1. These ￿ndings suggest
a mixed role for both general and ￿rm-speci￿c human capital in the promotion process.
Most interesting for assessing the relevance of the learning model are the duration in
previous rank e⁄ects. First, all the duration e⁄ects are negative and highly signi￿cant. This
suggests the presence of fast tracks, i.e. short durations in previous ranks imply higher
subsequent promotion probabilities. Second, the negative duration e⁄ects are larger (in
absolute value) for the more recent ranks. The hypothesis that the duration in previous
rank e⁄ects are equal can be rejected at the 1% signi￿cance level for rank 3 professors
promoted to rank 4 and at the 9% signi￿cance level for rank 2 professors promoted to rank 3
(2-sided Wald tests). For example, the promotion probability of a rank 3 professor to rank 4
is especially high if his duration in rank 2 was short. Short durations in the more distant rank
1 or rank 0 (Ph.D. or postdoc) increase the promotion probability to a lesser extent, and a
young age at ￿rst entry has the lowest impact on the promotion probability. The promotion
probabilities to rank 2 and 3 show similar declining duration e⁄ects. As discussed above,
these declining duration in previous rank e⁄ects indicate the presence of the late beginner
property, as also predicted by the learning model.
However, both the evidence for fast tracks and the late beginner property may stem
18As mentioned earlier, we estimate the hazard model after excluding all professors whose career was
impacted by the ranking reform. As an alternative approach, we also estimated the model with the full data
set for the period 1991-2006, after adding a dummy variable for duration in rank 1 (DUR1
j) interacted with
a dummy variable for professors impacted by the reform. Both approaches gave qualitatively very similar
results.
21from the fact that we have not yet included performance measures as explanatory variables.
Accounting for performance may especially matter for these results since performance tends
to be highly persistent over time. It is therefore important to assess whether the ￿ndings on
the learning model remain in the complete model.
The complete model does not only include the time in current rank e⁄ects (￿r
t), the
duration in previous rank e⁄ects (DUR) and the individual and contract characteristics
(OTHER), but in addition also the teaching and research performance measures (PERF).
Interestingly, the complete model still yields the inverse U-shaped pattern for the time in
current rank e⁄ects (￿r
t). Figure 5 converts the estimated ￿r
t into hazard rates for a rep-
resentative individual with average characteristics. This shows the promotion hazard rate
is extremely small during the ￿rst two years when the administrative restrictions prevent
promotions. The promotion hazard rate increases sharply in the third year and subsequently
shows a gradual decrease while remaining signi￿cantly larger than in the ￿rst two years. This
pattern suggests that the administrative restrictions on promotions in the ￿rst two years are
e⁄ectively binding. In the third and fourth year there appears to be a catching up with higher
promotion rates, which then gradually return to more ￿normal￿lower levels. It is interesting
to see that a similar pattern is found for promotions hazard rates in all ranks.
We can summarize this discussion as follows:
Observation 8 Because of administrative restrictions the promotion rates are signi￿cantly
lower during the ￿rst two years. They increase sharply in the third and fourth year and then
gradually decline, indicating the administrative restrictions form a binding constraint.
Table 9 shows the parameter estimates of the other variables. The ￿ndings for the
individual and contract characteristics remain qualitatively similar, but the magnitudes may
di⁄er. For example, while a part-time position still has a negative impact on the promotion
probability, the e⁄ect is considerably smaller and is at best only marginally signi￿cant. This
shows that being full-time is not rewarded per se, but rather because it results in stronger
teaching and/or research performance.
More importantly, including the performance variables has an impact on the estimated
duration in previous rank e⁄ects. The estimated e⁄ects are still negative and highly signi￿-
cant, and their magnitudes are still declining from the most recent to older ranks. However,
two observations are noteworthy. First, the estimated rank e⁄ects become smaller (in ab-
solute value). Hence, part of the estimated fast track e⁄ect is eliminated after including the
performance characteristics, as may be expected if performance shows some persistence over
time. Second, the declining pattern from most recent to older ranks becomes weaker. The
hypothesis that the duration in previous rank e⁄ects are equal can now only be rejected at
22the 7% signi￿cance level for rank 3 professors promoted to rank 4, and it can only be rejected
at the 23% signi￿cance level for rank 2 professors promoted to rank 3 (2-sided Wald tests).
The evidence of a late beginner property therefore becomes considerably weaker than in the
model without performance measures.
We can summarize these ￿ndings as follows.
Observation 9 The fast track and late beginner properties of the learning model have strong
empirical support in the model without performance measures. In the model with research
and teaching performance, the estimated magnitude of fast track e⁄ects is smaller but still
signi￿cant, and the evidence for the late beginner property becomes weaker.
How should we relate this conclusion to earlier ￿ndings in the literature? On the one hand,
it suggests that previous work such as Chiappori et al. (1999) has overestimated the relevance
of learning theories because it has not properly controlled for performance measures. But on
the other hand, we do ￿nd at least some weak evidence in favor of the learning model. Also,
the importance of learning may be less relevant in universities than in private companies
because universities may have better information about new hires￿ability and because the
job content changes less as one moves up in the hierarchy. Future research with performance
data (based on other universities and/or private companies) may yield further insight in the
role of the learning model when performance is accounted for.
We can now turn to the estimated e⁄ects of the performance measures. The number of
administrative duties do not appear to play a signi￿cant role, except for promotion to the
highest rank. However, this performance variable is only an imperfect variable and does
not capture many of the administrative tasks. Teaching performance refers to the actual
teaching load, i.e. number of week-hours (with 1 week-hour corresponding to 26￿ 30 hours
of teaching per year). Research performance is the annual average of the 5-year cumulative
number of publications and average impact in three areas: SSCI, SCIE and Proceedings.
We have interacted both the teaching and the research measures by the three university
groups (humanities, exact and medical sciences), since Table 3 documented large di⁄erences
in cultures and standards across the three groups.
Table 9 shows that teaching load has a positive and highly signi￿cant impact on the
promotion probabilities for professors in almost all ranks and groups. The only insigni￿cant
e⁄ect of teaching load is for promotion to rank 4 in humanities. The positive e⁄ects are
quantitatively the highest in medical sciences, but this is because the average teaching load
in medical sciences in lower than elsewhere, as shown earlier in Table 3. Teaching load has
an equal e⁄ect on the promotion probability to rank 2 and rank 3. It has a smaller e⁄ect
23on the promotion probability to rank 4, at least for professors in humanities and medical
sciences.
Professors in humanities have signi￿cantly higher promotion probabilities to any rank if
they have published a lot in their own ￿eld, SSCI. Professors in humanities also have higher
promotion probabilities to rank 2 and 3 if they have published more in SCIE, and they have
higher promotion probabilities to rank 4 if they have published in Proceedings. Publica-
tion impact does not appear to positively in￿ uence promotion probabilities for professors in
humanities.
Professors in exact and medical sciences do not show increased promotion probabilities
if they have published in SSCI, which is outside their ￿eld. But they do show signi￿cantly
higher promotion probabilities if they have published in SCIE and Proceedings. Furthermore,
publication impact has positive and signi￿cant e⁄ects on their probability of being promoted,
in contrast with the lack of such an e⁄ect for professors in humanities. This may be due to a
stronger recognition of publication impact in exact and medical sciences, or because impact
is better measured here than in humanities. Professors in medical sciences are not rewarded
for publications in SCIE when considered for promotion to rank 4, but they are still rewarded
for publications in Proceedings. For professors in exact sciences, the opposite is true: they
are not rewarded for publications in Proceedings, but they still are for publications in SCIE.
It is interesting to note that we estimate a much higher e⁄ect of the number of publications
on the promotion probability for professors in humanities than for professors in medical or
exact sciences. For example, the e⁄ect of a SSCI publication on the promotion probability of
a humanities professor varies between 0.83 and 1.11, whereas the e⁄ect of a SCIE publication
on the promotion probability of an exact sciences professor is only between 0.06 and 0.20.
This large di⁄erence is largely due to the fact that the average number of publications of
exact sciences professors in SCIE is about 10 times larger than that of humanities professors
in SSCI (as shown earlier in Table 3). Hence, performance evaluation tends to be relative
to the other individuals in the same group. One interpretation could be that articles have
more coauthors in medical and exact sciences than in humanities, such that one additional
publication receives less in medical and exact sciences than in humanities.
It is also of interest to compare the magnitudes at which teaching and research are
rewarded (bearing in mind the di⁄erences in publications across groups shown in Table 3).
To illustrate, consider the promotion probabilities to rank 2. In humanities, an annual group-
average of 0.3 publications per year in SSCI seems equivalent to a teaching load of about
2.4 week-hours (or about half of the average teaching load in humanities of 5.3 hours).19 In
exact sciences an average of 3 publications per year in SCIE seems equivalent with a teaching
19We ￿nd the equivalence in teaching load using the following calculation:
0:3(1:11)
0:14 = 2:4:
24load of 1.6 week-hours (less than 1/3 of the average teaching load of 5.4 hours). In medical
sciences, an average of 4.5 publications per year gives the same promotion probability as
a teaching load of 3.4 week-hours (which is the average teaching load in medical sciences).
These calculations are only illustrative, but they indicate that there are di⁄erences in the
relative weight attached to teaching and research across the three disciplines.
We ￿nally extended the model to allow the performance variables to have di⁄erent e⁄ects
on promotion probabilities in the second half of the sample period (after 2001). These results
(not shown) indicate that the university did not change its policy over the period, for example
by rewarding research more relative to teaching in recent years.
We summarize the role of performance measures as follows:
Observation 10 Both teaching and research performance play an important role in ex-
plaining promotion probabilities. There are important di⁄erences between the three main
groups.
5.4 Sensitivity analysis
The previous section estimated a discrete-time hazard rate model of promotion. This model
assumes promotion depends on absolute performance, since a professor￿ s promotion probabil-
ity depends on its own characteristics and not on the characteristics of other professors that
are being consider for promotion at the same time. However, it appears plausible to expect
that promotions are based on relative performance evaluation because of the institutional
rules of the university discussed earlier. Each year the university allocates a ￿xed number
of promotion slots for each group. Professors then participate in a promotion ￿tournament￿
and the highest ranked candidates per group promote to the next level. We had attempted
to account for the possibility of relative performance evaluation by including a full set of
cohort ￿xed e⁄ects, denoting the academic year at which a professor was promoted to this
current rank.
In this section we will more directly take into account the institutional rules of the
university and estimate a model of relative performance evaluation. We propose a discrete
choice model that explicitly models the decision process within the university. Traditional
discrete choice models, such as multinomial logit, assume that the decision maker may choose
1 out of a ￿xed set of J alternatives. From the observed choice, one can infer that this choice
gives the highest utility across all available alternatives. In the current situation, the decision
maker (the university) chooses the K most preferred alternatives (promotion slots) out of a
25￿xed set of J alternatives (eligible professors), where 1 ￿ K < J.20 It can be shown that the
multinomial logit model easily generalizes to the case where a ￿xed number of K alternatives
are chosen.
More precisely, in each year t, for each rank j and each university group g (humanities, ex-
act and medical sciences) we consider the promotion decision of each professor j = 1;￿￿￿ ;J
rg
t .
The university has K
rg





and it uses an annual tournament for each rank and group to select the most preferred profes-
sors for promotion. To simplify notation we drop the superscripts r and g in the subsequent
discussion (or equivalently, we subsume them in the subscript t). Let yjt be the promotion
decision for professor j at period t, taking values 1 for promotion and 0 otherwise. Let
yt = (y1t;￿￿￿ ;yJtt) be the overall tournament outcome at period t (and rank/group). It is
clear that
PJt
j=1 yjt = Kt, i.e. the observed number of ones is equal to the number of available
promotion slots. As shown by for example Hamerle and Ronning (1995), the probability of


















j=1 djt (￿￿(t) ￿ vjt)
￿; (3)
Here, dt = (d1t;￿￿￿ ;dJtt), where dij equals 0 or 1,
PJi
j dij = Ki, and St is the set of all possible
combinations with Kt chosen alternatives and Jt ￿ Kt non-chosen alternatives. Note that
this model is also equivalent to a discrete-time version of the Box-Cox model accounting for
ties.
We estimate this tournament model of relative performance for promotions to rank 2,
rank 3 and rank 4. For each rank we observe a total of 48 tournaments, i.e. the 16 years
during 1991￿ 2006 multiplied by the three university groups. But the informational content
of each tournament is higher than in a traditional multinomial logit model, since we do not
observe a single selected alternative but rather Kt selected alternatives per tournament.
Table 10 shows the empirical results for the complete model, i.e. including time in current
rank e⁄ects, duration in previous rank e⁄ects and contract and individual characteristics.
Cohort ￿xed e⁄ects are no longer included since the model is already one of relative per-
formance. The parameter estimates are remarkably close to those obtained from the earlier
discrete-time hazard model of promotion with cohort ￿xed e⁄ects (Table 9). The statistical
signi￿cance of the parameter estimates also remains very similar. This is true for both the
individual and contract characteristics and the performance variables. If anything, it ap-
20If one would observe K = 0 or K = J, the observation on the decision maker would not contain useful
information.
26pears that the learning theory of promotions has even somewhat weaker empirical support.
The duration in past rank e⁄ects remain negative and highly signi￿cant (fast tracks), but
less so than in the discrete-time hazard rate model of Table 9. Furthermore, the duration in
past rank e⁄ects still have a declining pattern from most recent to older ranks (late beginner
property), but the hypothesis that they are equal cannot be rejected at the 11% signi￿cance
level for rank 3 professors promoted to rank 4 (versus 7% signi￿cance level in the hazard
rate model), and it cannot be rejected at the 48% signi￿cance level for rank 2 professors
promoted to rank 4 (versus 23% signi￿cance level before).
In sum, the empirical results from the tournament model of promotions yield the same
conclusions as our earlier results from the hazard rate model of promotions.
6 Conclusion
We collected a rich personnel data set of a large European university. A unique feature of our
data is the relatively simple personnel policy rules compared to other studies. Furthermore,
we have good measures of performance in contrast with previous studies. These features
make the data set particularly well-suited to study the relevance of internal labor market
theories.
We ￿nd strong evidence for Doeringer and Piore￿ s two conditions for the existence of an
internal labor market, considerably stronger than evidence found in other work. First, the
lowest academic rank is a strong port of entry and the highest rank is a port of exit. In fact,
in the large majority of cases entry occurs even prior to entering the academic ranks (at the
Ph.D. or post-doctoral stage). To the extent that exit occurs before the highest academic
rank it is because retirement age has already been reached, which has not been documented
in earlier studies. Second, wages do not follow external wage developments, since they follow
administrative rules that have not been modi￿ed for a long time.
Having established the presence of an internal labor market, we subsequently look at
internal promotion dynamics to assess the relevance of alternative internal labor market
theories. Consistent with incentive theories, research and teaching performance turn out to
be crucial determinants of promotion dynamics. Learning theories of internal labor markets
appear to have support when we do not account for observed performance, but the evidence
becomes much weaker once we control for performance. These ￿ndings suggest the need for
further research on other companies and/or universities, to see how earlier conclusions are
a⁄ected once good measures of performance are taken into account.
Finally, we ￿nd that administrative rigidities play an important role in explaining pro-
motion dynamics. For example, the university has a rule of not promoting individuals within
27the ￿rst two years of a previous promotion. It turns out that this rule is largely followed,
and that it constitutes an e⁄ective constraint on promotion probabilities, since there is a
disproportionate increase in the hazard rate of promotion in the third and fourth year. This
example suggests that administrative rules constrain personnel policies and may entail ine¢ -
ciencies. Further comparative research on other universities would be required to see whether
this conclusion can be generalized to guide policy reforms.
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Table 1: Variables List
Variable name Description
ID employee unique identi￿er number
Acyear academic year
Individual and Contract Characteristics
Age age in years (day precision)
Female gender indicator =1 for female, =0 for male
Foreign nationality indicator =1 for foreigners, =0 for locals
Ph.D. own university =1 if last Ph.D. is from this university
Ph.D. same country =1 if last Ph.D. is from the same country but a di⁄erent university
Ph.D. world =1 if last Ph.D. is from a university outside of this country
External entrant indicator =1 if external entrant, =0 if not
Rank 1 entrant indicator =1 if enters professorship in rank 1, =0 if not
Rank 2 entrant indicator =1 if enters professorship in rank 2, =0 if not
Rank 3 entrant indicator =1 if enters professorship in rank 3, =0 if not
Rank 4 entrant indicator =1 if enters professorship in rank 4, =0 if not
Rank number =0 non professorship ranks, =1, 2, 3 and 4 for professorship
Part-time university =1 if working part-time at the university, =0 if full-time
Tenure =1 if tenured, =0 if temporary
Seniority wage seniority in rank
Group standardized group name
Duration Variables
Age at entry age at entry in any rank
Duration - rank 0 number of years prior to rank 1
Duration - rank 1 number of years in rank 1
Duration - rank 2 number of years in rank 2
Duration - rank 3 number of years in rank 3
Duration - rank 4 number of years in rank 4
Performance Measures
Highest duty highest duty level (1 to 5 with 5=lowest)
Number of duty total number of duties in the academic year
Teaching load teaching load in week-hours
SCIE publication total number of publications in SCIE
SCIE impact factor average impact factor in SCIE
SSCI publication total number of publications in SSCI
SSCI impact factor average impact factor in SSCI
Proceedings total number of publications in Proceedings
32Table 2: Summary statistics




Variables Obs Mean Obs Mean
Individual and Contract
Characteristics
Age 36,284 48.73 22,197 48.89
Female 36,284 0.09 22,197 0.13
Foreign 36,284 0.04 22,197 0.04
Ph.D. own university 22,950 0.86 17,070 0.85
Ph.D. same country 22,950 0.06 17,070 0.06
Ph.D. world 22,950 0.08 17,070 0.09
External entrant 36,284 0.18 22,197 0.15
Rank 1 entrant 36,284 0.87 22,197 0.86
Rank 2 entrant 36,284 0.06 22,197 0.10
Rank 3 entrant 36,284 0.04 22,197 0.02
Rank 4 entrant 36,284 0.03 22,197 0.01
Rank 1 36,284 0.27 22,197 0.22
Rank 2 36,284 0.16 22,197 0.26
Rank 3 36,284 0.15 22,197 0.19
Rank 4 36,284 0.41 22,197 0.33
Part-time university 35,175 0.30 21,502 0.33
Tenure 36,277 0.84 22,197 0.85
Seniority 28,148 9.89 18,877 11.73
Medical Sciences Grp. 35,547 0.31 22,173 0.35
Exact Sciences Grp. 35,547 0.29 22,173 0.30
Humanities Grp. 35,547 0.38 22,173 0.34
Other Grp. 35,547 0.01 22,173 0.01
Duration Variables
Age at entry 36,284 30.65 22,197 29.21
Duration - rank 0 36,284 6.39 22,197 7.45
Duration - rank 1 36,284 4.07 22,197 4.12
Duration - rank 2 36,284 1.22 22,197 2.00
Duration - rank 3 36,284 1.67 22,197 1.83
Duration - rank 4 36,284 4.68 22,197 3.86
Performance Measures
Highest Duty 31,158 1.11 22,197 1.07
Number of Duty 31,158 0.31 22,197 0.31
Teaching Load 31,158 5.08 22,197 4.61
SCIE Publication 20,741 2.52 20,741 2.52
SCIE Impact Factor 20,741 2.02 20,741 2.02
SSCI Publication 13,669 0.12 13,669 0.12
SSCI Impact Factor 13,669 0.11 13,669 0.11
Proceedings 14,947 0.27 14,947 0.27
Note: Shows the number of observations and mean value of each variable of interest
for the entire data set, 1972-2007, and for the subperiod 1991-2007. The information is
complete or almost complete for most of the variables, except for performance measures
prior to 1991.
33Table 3: Performance by Group Summary Statistics
Exact Sciences Humanities Medical Sciences
Variables Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev. Mean St. Dev.
Teaching Load 5.37 4.65 5.27 3.34 3.42 3.64
SCIE Publication 3.09 4.43 0.12 0.49 4.50 6.40
SCIE Impact Factor 1.86 2.19 0.16 0.67 4.08 3.58
SSCI Publication 0.02 0.13 0.30 0.65 0.04 0.20
SSCI Impact Factor 0.02 0.14 0.24 0.61 0.05 0.27
Proceedings 0.73 1.56 0.05 0.18 0.11 0.31
Note: Shows teaching and research performance for the subperiod 1991-2007 by group. Teaching is in
week-hours over the academic year. Research performance measures are annual averages over the last 5
years, in line with the university promotion policy (which considers the last 5 years also).
Table 4: Professorship Transition Matrix
Academic Year 1991 to 2006 incl.
Temp Total Early Early
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Out Exit Exit Retire Retire Total
Int. Entry 612 130 18 7 - - - - - 767
Delayed Int. Entry 181 38 13 6 - - - - - 238
Ext. Entry 155 54 32 19 - - - - - 260
Total Entry 948 222 63 32 - - - - - 1,265
Rank 1 3,818 616 7 0 7 151 103 24 24 4,599
Rank 2 0 4,586 667 12 10 165 57 39 69 5,440
Rank 3 0 0 3,337 426 1 125 20 35 70 3,889
Rank 4 1 0 0 6,425 1 386 29 73 284 6,813
Temp Out 7 9 4 3 48 - - - - 71
Total 4,774 5,433 4,078 6,898 67 827 209 171 447 22,077
Note: The intersection of rows 5￿ 8 and columns 1￿ 4 shows the career transitions of professors employed in one of the four
academic ranks. Non-promotions or stays are on the ￿diagonal￿ (starting from the ￿fth row onwards), promotions are to the
right of this diagonal and demotions are to the left. Total Entry is the sum of internal, delayed internal and external entry (all
rows displayed in italic). Total Exit is the sum of early exit, early retire and retire (all columns displayed in italic). Temp Out
refers to professors who temporarily exit the university to return later in one of the four professorship ranks. A zero value truly
means that this type of transition never took place, while "-" implies that this type of transition is not possible.
34Table 5: Basic career characteristics statistics
Rank
1 2 3 4 All
Data set: All observations between 1991 and 2006 incl.
Total number of entrants and promoted into rank 915 1,140 706 443 3,204
Percent of entrants into rank 100.0 21.5 7.8 6.8 38.9
of which: % Internal entrants 84.5 17.0 3.7 2.7 31.4
% External entrants 15.5 4.5 4.1 4.1 7.5
Percent of promoted into rank 0.0 78.5 92.2 93.2 61.1
Total number of exits out of rank 151 165 125 386 827
Percent of early exits 68.2 34.5 16.0 7.5 25.3
Percent of retirement exits 31.8 65.5 84.0 92.5 74.7
Promotion rate per year 15.0 13.0 11.6 na 13.3
Exit rate per year 3.1 3.0 3.2 5.7 3.1
Data set: Entrants into professorship between 1991 and 1999 incl.
Total number of all entrants into rank 549 110 26 13 698
Percent with 1-2 year career 3.6 2.7 11.5 15.4 4.0
Percent with 3-8 year career 12.0 15.5 30.8 15.4 13.3
of which: % Holding 1 title 89.4 76.5 87.5 100.0 87.1
% Holding 2 titles 6.1 17.6 12.5 - 8.6
% Holding 3 titles 4.5 5.9 - - 4.3
Percent with 8+ year career 84.3 81.8 57.7 69.2 82.7
of which: % Holding 1 title 18.1 23.3 26.7 100.0 20.5
% Holding 2 titles 27.6 26.7 73.3 - 28.2
% Holding 3 titles 25.5 50.0 - - 28.2
Avg. years in univ. prior to entry in professorship 8.4 7.2 4.2 1.9 7.9
Std deviation 7.4 7.5 8.8 3.0 7.5
Note: The top panel shows the entry, exit and career characteristics of professor-years from 1991 to 2006.
To follow careers, while avoiding censoring problems, the bottom panel is restricted to all observations of
professors hired between 1991 to 1999.
35Table 6: Seniority Step Compliance
Rank number
Rank1 Rank2 Rank 3 Rank4 Total
Variation Within Rank
2 levels too low 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
1 level too low 0.5% 1.5% 0.7% 0.4% 0.7%
Right level 97.1% 90.7% 88.2% 96.1% 93.3%
1 level too high 0.2% 3.4% 5.6% 1.9% 2.9%
2 levels too high 1.1% 3.8% 5.6% 1.6% 2.9%
Total 99.1% 99.5% 99.9% 100.0% 99.8%
Variation Upon Promotion
2 levels too low - 15.1% 21.3% 18.8% 19.2%
1 level too low - 24.5% 28.5% 18.4% 23.9%
Right level - 50.0% 43.0% 58.9% 50.4%
1 level too high - 5.7% 2.1% 0.5% 2.2%
2 levels too high - 0.9% 3.4% 1.9% 2.4%
Total - 96.2% 98.3% 98.6 98.0%
Note: The top panel shows the variation between the actual wage seniority and the
predicted wage seniority when a professor remains in the same rank. The bottom panel
shows the variation between the actual and the predicted wage seniority when a professor
is promoted. The calculation uses data on full-time professors only, since the seniority
steps of part-timers and full-timers are di⁄erent and that of part-timers depend on the
percentage of appointment. Also, data are restricted to 1999 to 2006 inclusively, because
seniority steps could only be obtained for that period.
36Table 7: Promotion Hazard Rates
Total duration Period present in rank 2 before promotion
rank 1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+
0 - 2 13 25 16 18 10 6 11
1 - 17 14 18 - 14 - 40 8
2 - 11 30 30 17 26 31 33 31
3 - 4 41 39 28 21 12 8 12
4 2 2 37 33 6 16 10 6 9
5 - - 18 16 24 20 43 17 -
6 2 4 29 27 19 23 - - 20
7 - - 24 36 - 43 - - 100
8 - - 31 13 - - - - -
9+ - 2 5 3 4 21 17 20 29
All 0 3 25 26 15 20 15 11 12
Nbr. Obs. 829 762 659 448 299 215 151 109 296
Total duration Period present in rank 3 before promotion
rank 2 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9+
0 2 - 14 16 13 - 21 11 11
1 - - - - - - - 67 100
2 - - 24 44 11 29 25 - 40
3 1 - 40 40 40 13 50 25 -
4 - 3 42 34 36 33 14 17 10
5 - 3 24 43 17 14 - - -
6 - 3 27 10 7 30 - 20 -
7 - - 29 - - - 50 - -
8 - - 27 25 20 - - - -
9+ - - 8 4 - 40 - - -
All 0 1 30 27 20 17 24 19 12
Nbr. Obs. 499 453 392 230 142 87 50 32 48
Note: Shows the promotion hazard rates controlling for current and prior rank duration
of rank 2 professors (top panel) and rank 3 professors (bottom panel).
37Table 8: Discrete-Time Promotion Hazard Model -
Excluding Performance Measures
Promotion to Promotion to Promotion to
Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Individual and Contract
Characteristics
female -0.273 ** (0.119) -0.011 (0.159) -0.684 *** (0.246)
foreign 0.007 (0.264) -0.742 ** (0.329) 0.288 (0.484)
Ph.D. same country 0.299 (0.220) -0.750 ** (0.298) -0.162 (0.429)
Ph.D. world 0.570 ** (0.234) -0.315 (0.236) 0.069 (0.349)
external entrant 0.061 (0.194) 0.787 *** (0.257) -0.327 (0.352)
rank 2 entrant -0.719 *** (0.197) -0.506 * (0.290)
rank 3 entrant -2.157 *** (0.449)
part-time university -0.659 *** (0.133) -0.560 *** (0.163) -1.101 *** (0.245)
tenure 0.547 *** (0.131) 0.947 *** (0.266) 1.941 ** (0.781)
group exact sc. -0.246 * (0.128) -0.257 * (0.155) -0.230 (0.226)
group humanities -0.249 ** (0.124) -0.305 ** (0.151) -0.226 (0.226)
group other -1.131 *** (0.390) -0.746 * (0.428) -0.126 (0.872)
Duration
age at entry -0.054 *** (0.011) -0.078 *** (0.015) -0.083 *** (0.024)
duration rank 0 -0.050 *** (0.010) -0.070 *** (0.012) -0.118 *** (0.023)
duration rank 1 -0.148 *** (0.032) -0.206 *** (0.061)
duration rank 2 -0.280 *** (0.055)
Baseline Dummies YES YES YES
Rank Cohort Dummies YES YES YES
Observations Number 4295 3364 1939
df 36 36 39
ll -1480 -1050 -515.7
Note: The empirical results are based on the logistic discrete time hazard rate model (1). In promotion to rank 2, the
data set used is all professor-years in rank 1 and the dependent variable is a promotion to rank 2 dummy. The same
logic holds for promotion to ranks 3 and 4. All regressions include a full set of time in rank e⁄ects ￿r
t (t = 1;2;￿￿￿),
referred to as baseline dummies. All regressions also include individual and contract characteristics, duration variables
and rank cohort dummies. Data for the subperiod 1991-2006 are used and reform is accounted for. Standard errors
are in parentheses. Coe¢ cient signi￿cance is denoted using asterisks: *** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1
38Table 9: Discrete-Time Promotion Hazard Model -
Including Performance Measures
Promotion to Promotion to Promotion to
Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Individual and Contract
Characteristics
female -0.232 * (0.126) 0.078 (0.171) -0.428 * (0.260)
foreign 0.017 (0.276) -0.670 * (0.352) 0.218 (0.530)
Ph.D. same country 0.092 (0.238) -0.927 *** (0.326) -1.009 * (0.518)
Ph.D. world 0.485 * (0.255) -0.330 (0.256) -0.062 (0.407)
external entrant 0.067 (0.202) 0.817 *** (0.270) -0.269 (0.384)
rank 2 entrant -0.974 *** (0.217) -0.586 * (0.320)
rank 3 entrant -1.856 *** (0.498)
part-time university -0.259 * (0.146) 0.032 (0.187) -0.529 * (0.273)
tenure 0.467 *** (0.139) 0.776 *** (0.291) 2.032 ** (0.861)
group exact sc. 0.323 (0.235) 0.332 (0.381) 0.185 (0.733)
group humanities 0.554 ** (0.240) 0.706 ** (0.355) 1.457 ** (0.645)
group other 0.251 (0.426) 1.231 ** (0.509) 2.016 ** (1.013)
Duration
age at entry -0.031 *** (0.011) -0.051 *** (0.016) -0.073 *** (0.026)
duration rank 0 -0.037 *** (0.011) -0.062 *** (0.014) -0.114 *** (0.025)
duration rank 1 -0.115 *** (0.033) -0.192 *** (0.067)
duration rank 2 -0.224 *** (0.060)
Performance Measures
highest duty -0.107 (0.214) 0.088 (0.066) -0.078 (0.087)
number of duty 0.643 (0.967) -0.066 (0.229) 0.683 ** (0.315)
Exact Sciences
teaching load 0.115 *** (0.035) 0.071 *** (0.027) 0.126 *** (0.041)
SCIE publication 0.059 (0.043) 0.196 *** (0.039) 0.147 *** (0.042)
SCIE impact factor 0.221 *** (0.054) 0.115 ** (0.056) 0.109 (0.086)
SSCI publication 0.845 (0.940) 2.321 (1.653) 0.409 (2.638)
SSCI impact factor 0.162 (1.610) -0.073 (1.897) -0.412 (2.209)
Proceedings 0.599 *** (0.170) 0.264 *** (0.090) 0.107 (0.083)
Humanities
teaching load 0.144 *** (0.036) 0.125 *** (0.036) 0.042 (0.053)
SCIE publication 0.880 ** (0.443) 1.066 ** (0.454) 0.506 (0.361)
SCIE impact factor 0.119 (0.277) -0.538 * (0.290) 0.176 (0.273)
SSCI publication 1.114 *** (0.396) 0.831 *** (0.260) 0.998 ** (0.427)
SSCI impact factor -0.550 (0.415) -0.107 (0.247) -0.792 * (0.437)
Proceedings -1.731 (1.124) 1.017 (0.676) 2.321 ** (0.923)
Medical Sciences
teaching load 0.199 *** (0.039) 0.207 *** (0.040) 0.111 ** (0.052)
SCIE publication 0.155 *** (0.025) 0.164 *** (0.027) 0.029 (0.021)
SCIE impact factor 0.135 *** (0.023) 0.105 *** (0.029) 0.227 *** (0.048)
SSCI publication 0.530 (0.602) 1.853 * (0.958) -0.119 (0.655)
SSCI impact factor 0.235 (0.418) -0.255 (0.540) 1.917 ** (0.806)
Proceedings 0.286 (0.279) -0.244 (0.328) 1.404 *** (0.380)
Baseline Dummies YES YES YES
Rank Cohort Dummies YES YES YES
Observations Number 4295 3364 1939
df 58 58 61
ll -1387 -967.4 -468.6
Note: The empirical results are based on the logistic discrete time hazard rate model (1), as in Table 8. The
only di⁄erence is that each regression now also includes performance measures. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coe¢ cient signi￿cance is denoted using asterisks: *** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1
39Table 10: Conditional Logit Tournament Model -
Including Performance Measures
Promotion to Promotion to Promotion to
Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err. Coef. Std.Err.
Individual and Contract
Characteristics
female -0.247 * (0.127) 0.041 (0.173) -0.632 ** (0.260)
foreign 0.013 (0.277) -0.454 (0.337) 0.187 (0.531)
Ph.D. same country 0.039 (0.244) -0.936 *** (0.326) -0.527 (0.495)
Ph.D. world 0.391 (0.250) -0.285 (0.248) 0.169 (0.405)
external entrant 0.156 (0.202) 0.832 *** (0.265) -0.265 (0.370)
rank 2 entrant -0.914 *** (0.205) -0.470 (0.325)
rank 3 entrant -1.353 *** (0.493)
part-time university -0.272 * (0.143) 0.078 (0.189) -0.573 ** (0.276)
tenure 0.497 *** (0.136) 0.622 ** (0.283) 2.453 *** (0.880)
Duration
age at entry -0.035 *** (0.011) -0.054 *** (0.016) -0.084 *** (0.026)
duration rank 0 -0.035 *** (0.011) -0.068 *** (0.014) -0.097 *** (0.024)
duration rank 1 -0.096 *** (0.033) -0.202 *** (0.069)
duration rank 2 -0.225 *** (0.059)
Performance Measures
highest duty -0.048 (0.220) 0.095 (0.068) -0.095 (0.087)
number of duty 0.324 (0.996) -0.052 (0.238) 0.694 ** (0.313)
Exact Sciences
teaching load 0.125 *** (0.037) 0.082 *** (0.027) 0.138 *** (0.039)
SCIE publication 0.083 * (0.045) 0.196 *** (0.040) 0.148 *** (0.041)
SCIE impact factor 0.204 *** (0.055) 0.144 ** (0.056) 0.124 (0.087)
SSCI publication 0.847 (0.956) 1.949 (1.633) 0.554 (3.281)
SSCI impact factor -0.040 (1.678) 0.245 (1.856) -0.590 (2.873)
Proceedings 0.494 *** (0.172) 0.297 *** (0.094) 0.112 (0.083)
Humanities
teaching load 0.145 *** (0.037) 0.108 *** (0.038) 0.059 (0.056)
SCIE publication 0.845 * (0.442) 1.133 *** (0.435) 0.397 (0.329)
SCIE impact factor 0.126 (0.281) -0.517 * (0.285) 0.220 (0.245)
SSCI publication 1.200 *** (0.398) 0.701 ** (0.276) 0.807 * (0.416)
SSCI impact factor -0.630 (0.419) -0.036 (0.258) -0.637 (0.441)
Proceedings -1.930 (1.143) 0.825 (0.678) 1.681 * (0.951)
Medical Sciences
teaching load 0.202 *** (0.039) 0.207 *** (0.040) 0.088 (0.053)
SCIE publication 0.150 *** (0.026) 0.141 *** (0.027) 0.059 ** (0.024)
SCIE impact factor 0.134 *** (0.023) 0.113 *** (0.030) 0.204 *** (0.048)
SSCI publication 0.556 (0.633) 1.776 * (1.026) 0.521 (0.609)
SSCI impact factor 0.162 (0.428) -0.100 (0.553) 1.513 ** (0.692)
Proceedings 0.221 (0.283) -0.027 (0.320) 1.364 *** (0.394)
Baseline Dummies YES YES YES
Rank Cohort Dummies NO NO NO
Observations Number 4170 3419 1824
df 37 39 41
ll -1226 -839.2 -388.1
Note: The empirical results are based on the conditional logit ￿tournament￿model (3), with Kt chosen alternatives
and Jt ￿ Kt non-chosen alternatives per tournament t. The data sets and covariates of the complete model are
used, but group membership dummies and rank cohort dummies are excluded. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Coe¢ cient signi￿cance is denoted using asterisks: *** is p<0.01, ** is p<0.05, and * is p<0.1
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Note: This ￿gure is a modi￿ed version of the ￿gure ￿rst presented by Chiappori et al. (1999). Worker A
is the early starter, reaching level 2 ￿rst. Worker B is the late beginner, able to catch up with worker A
by level 3. The late beginner property predicts that worker B (the late beginner) will be promoted more
quickly in the future (to level 4).
41Figure 2: Evolution of the number of professors







































































































































































































































































































Note: Shows the evolution of the total number of professors (right axis and bold continuous line) and the
evolution broken down by the three university groups (left axis and dotted lines).
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Professors per Rank
Graphs by Academic Year
Note: Shows the structure of the hierarchy at di⁄erent points in time by gender. Comparison of the
top panel and the bottom panel reveals the 1991 reform in the ranking system with the addition of rank
2. Within the subperiods 1972-1990 (top panel) and 1991-2007 (bottom panel) the hierarchy is relatively
stable.
43Figure 4: Wage scales and wage path with
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Note: Each non bold line is a di⁄erent salary scale, one for each of the four professorship ranks. The salary
of a professor in rank 1 with zero years of seniority is normalized to 100. The bold line shows the career
progression of a professor entering the university in rank 1 and being promoted every 5 years.
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Note: Promotion hazard rates by rank estimated using the complete model for a representative individual
with average characteristics.
9 Appendix. Further data analysis
We ￿rst present further descriptive information on the university and its personnel policies.
We subsequently present the econometric results of the promotion hazard rate model in
terms of the marginal e⁄ects of the explanatory variables on the promotion hazard rate
(rather than in terms of the underlying parameters).
459.1 Further descriptive statistics
Table A.1 provides more detail on the summary statistics presented earlier in Table 2. In
addition to showing the number of observations and the means for the full period 1972￿ 2007
and the most recent subperiod 1991￿ 2007, it now also presents the information for the older
subperiods 1972￿ 1979 and 1980￿ 1990.
Table A. 1: Summary statistics
Period 1972-2007 Period 1972-1979 Period 1980-1990 Period 1991-2007
Number of
Observations 36,284 5,126 8,961 22,197
Professors 2691 861 1231 2282
Variables Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Individual and Contract
Characteristics
Age 36,284 48.73 5,126 47.41 8,961 49.09 22,197 48.89
Female 36,284 0.09 5,126 0.02 8,961 0.03 22,197 0.13
Foreign 36,284 0.04 5,126 0.05 8,961 0.03 22,197 0.04
Ph.D. own university 22,950 0.86 1,439 0.90 4,441 0.88 17,070 0.85
Ph.D. same country 22,950 0.06 1,439 0.07 4,441 0.07 17,070 0.06
Ph.D. world 22,950 0.08 1,439 0.03 4,441 0.05 17,070 0.09
External Entrant 36,284 0.18 5,126 0.31 8,961 0.21 22,197 0.15
Rank 1 Entrant 36,284 0.87 5,126 0.82 8,961 0.91 22,197 0.86
Rank 2 Entrant 36,284 0.06 5,126 - 8,961 - 22,197 0.10
Rank 3 Entrant 36,284 0.04 5,126 0.09 8,961 0.05 22,197 0.02
Rank 4 Entrant 36,284 0.03 5,126 0.09 8,961 0.04 22,197 0.01
Rank 1 36,284 0.27 5,126 0.29 8,961 0.40 22,197 0.22
Rank 2 36,284 0.16 na na na na 22,197 0.26
Rank 3 36,284 0.15 5,126 0.11 8,961 0.10 22,197 0.19
Rank 4 36,284 0.41 5,126 0.60 8,961 0.51 22,197 0.33
Part-time university 35,175 0.30 5,007 0.27 8,666 0.25 21,502 0.33
Tenure 36,277 0.84 5,119 0.82 8,961 0.83 22,197 0.85
Seniority 28,148 9.89 3,505 5.37 5,766 6.60 18,877 11.73
Medical Sciences Grp. 35,547 0.31 4,486 0.24 8,888 0.27 22,173 0.35
Exact Sciences Grp. 35,547 0.29 4,486 0.29 8,888 0.28 22,173 0.30
Humanities Grp. 35,547 0.38 4,486 0.46 8,888 0.45 22,173 0.34
Other Grp. 35,547 0.01 4,486 0.00 8,888 0.00 22,173 0.01
Duration Variables
Age at entry 36,284 30.65 5,126 34.42 8,961 32.04 22,197 29.21
Duration - rank 0 36,284 6.39 5,126 3.93 8,961 5.20 22,197 7.45
Duration - rank 1 36,284 4.07 5,126 2.95 8,961 4.58 22,197 4.12
Duration - rank 2 36,284 1.22 5,126 0.00 8,961 0.00 22,197 2.00
Duration - rank 3 36,284 1.67 5,126 1.32 8,961 1.49 22,197 1.83
Duration - rank 4 36,284 4.68 5,126 5.58 8,961 6.22 22,197 3.86
Performance Measures
Highest Duty 31,158 1.11 - - 8,961 1.21 22,197 1.07
Number of Duty 31,158 0.31 - - 8,961 0.33 22,197 0.31
Teaching Load 31,158 5.08 - - 8,961 6.25 22,197 4.61
SCIE Publication 20,741 2.52 - - - - 20,741 2.52
SCIE Impact Factor 20,741 2.02 - - - - 20,741 2.02
SSCI Publication 13,669 0.12 - - - - 13,669 0.12
SSCI Impact Factor 13,669 0.11 - - - - 13,669 0.11
Proceedings 14,947 0.27 - - - - 14,947 0.27
46Evolution of individual characteristics Figure A.1 presents the evolution of several
individual characteristics (which are time-invariant individual characteristics, in contrast
with the performance variables discussed further below). The share of non-foreign professors
has remained remarkably high, ￿ uctuating only slightly around the average of 96% during
the entire period. The share of female professors has substantially increased especially since
the late 1980s, going from less than 1% in 1972 to approximatively 20% in 2007. The relative
importance of professors with a Ph.D. from this university has gradually decreased over time
but it remains fairly high at more than 80%.
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47Evolution of performance characteristics Figure A.2 shows the evolution of teaching
load and Figure A.3 shows the evolution of research performance (both of which are evi-
dently time-varying individual characteristics). Recall that teaching load information is only
available since 1980 and research performance information is only available since 1991.
Figure A.2 shows the average teaching load per professor, measured as the number of
week-hours, with one week-hour corresponding to 26￿ 30 hours of teaching per year. It re-
mained stable at large levels during 1980￿ 1986, and it then gradually decreased to sta-
ble levels during 1992￿ 2003. It increased again in 2004 and 2005, presumably due to the
Bachelor-Master reforms. Since 1992, the average teaching load has been substantially lower
in medical sciences than in exact sciences and humanities.
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Figure A.3 displays publication information for SCIE, SSCI and Proceedings measures.
The top panel shows the trend of the SCIE measures by group. The bottom panel shows
the trend of SSCI and Proceedings.
The top panel shows that in medical sciences the average quality of publications (impact)
has increased more strongly than the average quantity of publications over the last 16 years.
In exact sciences, the reverse seems true: the average quantity of publications has increased
more rapidly than the average quality (impact). By 2007 the researchers of both groups
were publishing a similar number of papers on average, but the average impact factor of
48researchers in medical sciences remained higher. In humanities, the number of publications
and impact factor in SCIE has been more or less stable at low levels over the entire period.
The bottom panel of Figure A.3 shows that SSCI performance is mainly relevant to the
humanities group, and both the quantity and quality has been steadily increasing over the
period for this group. Proceedings are only relevant to exact sciences and this has also been
steadily increasing for this group.
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Graphs by University Group 50Evolution of entry age in rank The entry age in rank is the age at which a professor
enters the rank, either as a new hire or through promotion from a previous rank.
Figure A.4 shows that average entry age in rank 1 and rank 2 are very stable across the
entire time period. Entry age in rank 3 and 4 follow a somewhat more erratic pattern before
1992, but are also stable afterwards. In contrast with Rosenblum and Rubin Rosenblum
(1990), we do not ￿nd that entry age into the internal labor market has been increasing in
time.
The entry age in rank appear somewhat high. This is because we report average entry
age and the distribution is quite skewed. The median entry ages in rank are considerably
lower.
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Further transition matrices Table A.2 extends the earlier transition matrix of Table A.2
in the main text. It now also shows the transition matrix for the ￿rst subperiod 1972￿ 1990,
in addition to the transition matrix for the period 1991￿ 2006 shown earlier.
51Table A. 2: Professorship Transition Matrices
Academic Year 1972 to 1990 incl.
Temp Total Early Early
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Out Exit Exit Retire Retire Total
Int. Entry 648 33 5 8 - - - - - 694
Delayed Int. Entry 67 5 1 1 - - - - - 74
Ext. Entry 97 6 5 17 - - - - - 125
Total Entry 812 44 11 26 - - - - - 893
Rank 1 4230 309 261 128 111 5 53 14 44 5044
Rank 2 0 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Rank 3 1 0 1149 226 26 1 1 6 19 1403
Rank 4 0 0 8 7340 271 9 28 34 209 7628
Temp Out 5 0 1 8 0 32 0 0 0 46
Total 5048 355 1430 7729 408 47 82 54 272 15017
Academic Year 1991 to 2006 incl.
Temp Total Early Early
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4 Out Exit Exit Retire Retire Total
Int. Entry 612 130 18 7 - - - - 767
Delayed Int. Entry 181 38 13 6 - - - - 238
Ext. Entry 155 54 32 19 - - - - 260
Total Entry 948 222 63 32 - - - - - 1,265
Rank 1 3,818 616 7 0 7 151 103 24 24 4,599
Rank 2 0 4,586 667 12 10 165 57 39 69 5,440
Rank 3 0 0 3,337 426 1 125 20 35 70 3,889
Rank 4 1 0 0 6,425 1 386 29 73 284 6,813
Temp Out 7 9 4 3 48 0 0 0 0 71
Total 4,774 5,433 4,078 6,898 67 827 209 171 447 22,077
A graphical representation of the evolution of the transition matrices is shown in Figure
5. We do not distinguish between di⁄erent types of entry and exit, and we omit the over-
whelming number of cases where individuals stay in the same rank. Figure A.5 reveals that
the transition process has indeed changed drastically after the reform of 1991. From 1991
onwards, the transition process has become fairly stable. Entry is mainly in rank 1, although
an increasing amount of entry in rank 2 takes place in recent years. Promotions are almost
always one-rank promotions. Exit mainly takes place at rank 4.




















































































































Academic Year 1973 to 1977 incl.
539.2 Further econometric regressions
We now present the econometric results of the promotion hazard rate model in terms of the
marginal e⁄ects of the explanatory variables on the promotion hazard rate, rather than in
































Tables 8 and 9 directly presented the estimated parameters ￿, ￿ and ￿. This had the advan-
tage of a good comparability with the estimates of the tournament promotion model in 10.
The two tables below will present the results in terms of the marginal e⁄ects on the hazard











= hjt (1 ￿ hjt)￿
r;
and we average this over all observations. For a discrete variable such as DUR1
j we compute
the di⁄erence between the hazard rate hjt evaluated at DUR1
j + 1 and the hazard rate hjt
evaluated at DUR1
j, and we again average this over all observations.
The two tables below show how the parameter estimates of the earlier Tables 8 and 9
translate in marginal e⁄ects on the promotion hazard rate. To illustrate, the table shows
that being female reduces the hazard rate of promotion to rank 2 by 2.5% and to rank 4 by
4.0%. As another example, the hazard rate of promotion to rank 3 is 6% lower for foreign
professors and 6.5% lower for professors with a Ph.D. from a di⁄erent university in the same
country.
54Table A. 3: Discrete-Time Promotion Hazard Model -
Excluding Performance Measures
Promotion to Promotion to Promotion to
Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
AMF Std.Err. AMF Std.Err. AMF Std.Err.
Individual and Contract
Characteristics
female -0.028 (0.013) -0.001 (0.015) -0.052 (0.022)
foreign 0.001 (0.028) -0.060 (0.025) 0.026 (0.045)
Ph.D. same country 0.033 (0.027) -0.062 (0.024) -0.013 (0.034)
Ph.D. world 0.068 (0.034) -0.029 (0.021) 0.006 (0.030)
external entrant 0.006 (0.021) 0.088 (0.036) -0.027 (0.028)
rank 2 entrant na na -0.065 (0.021) -0.045 (0.028)
rank 3 entrant na na na na -0.133 (0.041)
part-time university -0.069 (0.018) -0.051 (0.017) -0.084 (0.027)
tenure 0.056 (0.016) 0.074 (0.022) 0.106 (0.038)
group exact sc. -0.026 (0.014) -0.026 (0.016) -0.020 (0.020)
group humanities -0.027 (0.014) -0.030 (0.016) -0.019 (0.020)
group other -0.094 (0.029) -0.066 (0.034) -0.011 (0.074)
Duration
age at entry -0.006 (0.001) -0.008 (0.002) -0.007 (0.003)
duration rank 0 -0.005 (0.001) -0.007 (0.002) -0.010 (0.003)
duration rank 1 na na -0.014 (0.004) -0.017 (0.006)
duration rank 2 na na na na -0.022 (0.007)
Baseline Dummies YES YES YES
Rank Cohort Dummies YES YES YES
Observations Number 4295 3364 1939
df 36 36 39
ll -1480 -1050 -515.7
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
55Table A. 4: Discrete-Time Promotion Hazard Model -
Including Performance Measures
Promotion to Promotion to Promotion to
Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
AMF Std.Err. AMF Std.Err. AMF Std.Err.
Individual and Contract
Characteristics
female -0.022 (0.013) 0.007 (0.016) -0.031 (0.021)
foreign 0.002 (0.027) -0.052 (0.027) 0.017 (0.044)
Ph.D. same country 0.009 (0.024) -0.068 (0.026) -0.064 (0.035)
Ph.D. world 0.053 (0.033) -0.028 (0.022) -0.005 (0.031)
external entrant 0.007 (0.020) 0.083 (0.036) -0.02 (0.028)
rank 2 entrant na na -0.079 (0.025) -0.046 (0.029)
rank 3 entrant na na na na -0.113 (0.046)
part-time university -0.025 (0.015) 0.003 (0.017) -0.039 (0.024)
tenure 0.044 (0.016) 0.059 (0.024) 0.102 (0.045)
group exact sc. 0.030 (0.023) 0.027 (0.032) 0.012 (0.048)
group humanities 0.055 (0.027) 0.062 (0.034) 0.118 (0.065)
group other 0.023 (0.042) 0.120 (0.063) 0.173 (0.113)
Duration
age at entry -0.003 (0.001) -0.005 (0.002) -0.006 (0.003)
duration rank 0 -0.004 (0.001) -0.005 (0.002) -0.009 (0.003)
duration rank 1 na na -0.010 (0.004) -0.014 (0.007)
duration rank 2 na na na na -0.016 (0.007)
Performance Measures
highest duty -0.010 (0.020) 0.008 (0.006) -0.006 (0.007)
number of duty 0.074 (0.128) -0.006 (0.020) 0.058 (0.035)
Exact Sciences
teaching load 0.011 (0.004) 0.006 (0.003) 0.009 (0.005)
SCIE publication 0.005 (0.004) 0.016 (0.005) 0.011 (0.005)
SCIE impact factor 0.021 (0.007) 0.009 (0.005) 0.008 (0.007)
SSCI publication 0.094 (0.126) 0.269 (0.235) 0.032 (0.223)
SSCI impact factor 0.015 (0.157) -0.006 (0.146) -0.028 (0.137)
Proceedings 0.063 (0.023) 0.022 (0.009) 0.008 (0.007)
Humanities
teaching load 0.017 (0.005) 0.012 (0.004) 0.003 (0.004)
SCIE publication 0.119 (0.073) 0.122 (0.066) 0.042 (0.034)
SCIE impact factor 0.014 (0.033) -0.043 (0.023) 0.014 (0.023)
SSCI publication 0.158 (0.071) 0.091 (0.038) 0.087 (0.048)
SSCI impact factor -0.053 (0.036) -0.010 (0.022) -0.053 (0.031)
Proceedings -0.118 (0.048) 0.115 (0.093) 0.218 (0.114)
Medical Sciences
teaching load 0.021 (0.006) 0.021 (0.006) 0.009 (0.005)
SCIE publication 0.016 (0.004) 0.016 (0.004) 0.002 (0.002)
SCIE impact factor 0.014 (0.004) 0.010 (0.004) 0.019 (0.007)
SSCI publication 0.060 (0.077) 0.234 (0.145) -0.009 (0.049)
SSCI impact factor 0.025 (0.047) -0.023 (0.047) 0.189 (0.103)
Proceedings 0.030 (0.032) -0.022 (0.029) 0.134 (0.055)
Baseline Dummies YES YES YES
Rank Cohort Dummies YES YES YES
Observations Number 4295 3364 1939
df 58 58 61
ll -1387 -967.4 -468.6
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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